Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses by Mulhern, Pegeen
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 11
9-1-1990
Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the
Land: A Tort Recovery Standard for Pure
Economic Losses
Pegeen Mulhern
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pegeen Mulhern, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A Tort Recovery Standard for
Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 85 (1990), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/
vol18/iss1/11
MARINE POLLUTION, FISHERS, AND THE PILLARS 
OF THE LAND: A TORT RECOVERY STANDARD FOR 
PURE ECONOMIC LOSSES 
Pegeen Mulhern" 
The fishers will mourn and lament . . . and they will languish who 
spread nets upon the water. The workers in combed flax will be in 
despair . ... Those who are the pillars of the land will be crushed, 
and all who work for hire will be grieved. 
Isaiah, 19:8-9. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Careless disposal of hazardous substances,l dumping of chemicals, 
groundwater contamination, offshore drilling, and accidental spillage 
in the transportation of hazardous substances are only examples of 
the many causes of marine pollution,2 nevertheless, the American 
legal system lacks an adequate method for allocating damage awards 
between pollution victims. The catastrophic effects of a single marine 
pollution incident can include contamination of large expanses of 
waterways and beaches. 3 Damages may include the deaths of thou-
sands of animals and plants, as well as the destruction of habitats, 
• Editor in Chief, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 976 (E.D. Va. 1981) (discharge of 
hazardous chemicals). 
2 See generally Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 Hous. L. REV. 415, 418-19 (1970) 
(transportation, drilling, other sources of pollution); Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 
FORDHAM L. REV. 155-56 (1968) (transportation of oil). 
3 See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON V ALDEZ-IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF OIL iii-iv (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter ALASKA OIL SPILL 
COMM'N). The March 24, 1989, Exxon Valdez spill of over 11 million gallons of crude oil into 
Alaska's Prince William Sound caused extensive damage to wildlife and habitat. An area rich 
in natural resources with an economy highly dependent on the resources, Prince William 
Sound suffered tremendous losses as a result ofthe spill. [d.; see also Oil Spill by the Numbers, 
13 Alaska Fishermen's J. 12; 14 (Jan. 1990); Davidson, Valdez Reflections, SIERRA, May/June 
1990, at 43, 44. 
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resulting in severe economic 10sses.4 These losses may in turn cause 
sociological and psychological injuries to the nearby residents. 5 
When marine pollution does cause extensive damage, many people 
will mourn and lament along with the fishers. Other potential loss 
claimants may include boat owners and operators; marina, resort, 
and other beach-front business owners; tour operators; seafood pro-
cessors, distributors, and wholesalers; marine suppliers; fish farm-
ers; and employees in all of these businesses. 6 Losses sustained are 
often pure economic losses, unaccompanied by physical injury or 
property damage. 7 Seafood processors, for example, could suffer 
huge financial losses even though they may not suffer any property 
damage. Or, a resort that depends upon water-related activities 
might suffer a severe decline in bookings without damage to its 
property. 
In determining liability for marine pollution, the losses may be 
divided into four broad categories based upon the legal remedies 
available. 8 These categories consist of cleanup and containment ex-
penses, injuries to natural resources,9 physical injury or property 
damage,10 and pure economic 10sses. 11 Recovery is available for 
4 The United States Supreme Court, in a ruling on the permissibility of concurrent state 
and federal regulation of water pollution, discussed the enormous damage that might arise in 
marine pollution incidents. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 
333-34 n.5 (1973) (citing Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 316, 321-
23 (1969». 
5 See Hansen & Ray, Alaskan Oil Spill: Legal Fallout, TRIAL, Oct. 1989, at 30; ALASKA 
OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra note 3, at iii; see also Shutler, supra note 2, at 418-19. 
6 See Feder, Exxon Valdez's Sea of Litigation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § F, at 1, col. 
4; Sturgis, Oil Spill Law and Lawsuits-What's New at the Bar?, 13 Alaska Fishermen's J. 
104 (Jan. 1990). 
7 In common law proceedings, economic losses accompanied by physical injury or property 
damage are legally cognizable, while pure economic losses often are not. See, e.g., Union Oil 
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. 
Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979); 
W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 130 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS]; see infra notes 37-41 and accom-
panying text. 
8 See Hansen & Ray, supra note 5, at 30. 
9 Broadly defined, this category can include many injuries. For example, Alaska's water 
pollution statute defines natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground 
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in 
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the state or a municipality." ALASKA 
STAT. § 46.03.826(6) (Supp. 1989). 
10 This category may include damages to property of littoral owners, damage to boats, 
docks, and equipment, as well as other physical injuries. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chern. 
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
11 See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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cleanup and containment costs,12 natural resource damages,13 and 
economic losses with accompanying physical injuries or property 
damage. 14 
Pure economic losses, unlike the other three categories of pollution 
damage, often go uncompensated because of a general rule barring 
recovery for losses without physical injury.15 Pure economic losses 
typically include such things as business interruption damages, lost 
profits, lost earnings, and loss of prospective economic advantage. 16 
These losses might also include business overhead, travel expenses 
made necessary by plaintiff's condition after the accident, or expen-
ses incurred in efforts to limit the damage. 17 Historically, plaintiffs 
who suffered economic losses sought relief for damage caused by 
pollution through common law causes of action under nuisance18 or 
12 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0 (1982); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1653(b) (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1813-1814 (1982). 
13 See Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1980). Natural 
resources are held in public trust by the state and federal governments for all citizens. 
Damages for restoration and recovery can be claimed by the government under statutory and 
common law. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
14 See Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 23 So. 2d 756, 758 (1945) (en banc) (riparian 
owner of fishing resort allowed recovery for lost profits resulting from pollution damages 
accompanied by property damage); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 548, 
27 S.E.2d 538, 546-47 (1943) (downstream riparian owners granted recovery for economic 
losses from pollution accompanied by property damage); Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. v. 
Hancock, 286 S. W. 335, 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (operator of swimming pool in channel of 
river permitted recovery for lost profits accompanied by property damage resulting from 
pollution of river). 
15 The "physical injury rule" barring recovery for pure economic loss claims springs from 
two major cases: Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (charterers of 
ship denied recovery for economic loss through delay resulting from defendant's negligence 
in performing ship repair) and Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453 (1875) 
(contractor to landowner denied recovery for increased costs of performing road repair contract 
resulting from defendant's negligence). See infra notes 30~7 and accompanying text. 
16 Cases and texts use different terms to refer to interference with a business's loss of 
prospective economic gain. The protected interest is the reasonable expectation of economic 
advantage. 45 AM. JUR. 2n Interference § 50 (1969). Even when the physical harm is quite 
small and the economic losses enormous, the claims will be legally cognizable. But if there is 
no showing of physical harm, recovery is much less certain. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 
F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974). 
17 See, e.g., 45A AM. JUR. 2n §§ 607-609 (1969). 
18 See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 298 (1921) (interstate pollution claimed 
to be public nuisance); Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 62 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 
(E.D. Pa. 1945) (river pollution that injured the plaintiff's property and not the general public 
claimed to be public nuisance), aff'd per curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946); Hampton v. 
North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 547, 27 S.E.2d 538, 543-46 (1943) (pollution causing 
interference with fishing rights held to be a public nuisance); Columbia River Fishermen's 
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negligence. 19 Pure economic loss claims have been disallowed unless 
a plaintiff could establish a nuisance cause of action by showing 
special damages, or could make a case for compensation based upon 
one of the several exceptions to the "physical injury" rule. 
The extent to which courts will compensate pure economic losses 
remains an open question. Although courts have created numerous 
exceptions to the physical injury rule, they have not identified any 
specific standards for these exceptions. 20 In a widespread pollution 
incident where damages are extensive, courts can use the physical 
injury rule to limit a polluter's liability. 
Despite the comprehensive nature of the federal statutes regulat-
ing water pollution,21 many of the statutes fail to provide a remedy 
for private damages. 22 In some specific instances a plaintiff can over-
Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 660, 87 P.2d 195, 197 (1939) (public 
nuisance action upheld against city for polluting waters with sewage); Strandholm v. Barbey, 
145 Or. 427, 438-39, 26 P.2d 46,51 (1933) (public nuisance action upheld to enjoin maintenance 
of fish traps in a fishing area); Morris v. Graham, 16 Wash. 343, 345-46, 47 P. 752, 752 (1897) 
(public nuisance found in the use of fish traps that obstruct fishing grounds). Contra Kuehn 
v. City of Milwaukee, 83 Wis. 583, 588, 53 N.W. 912, 913 (1892) (public nuisance created when 
city dumped trash into lake, but fishers have no special rights that permit them to bring 
nuisance action against city). 
19 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (negligent operation 
of offshore drilling operation resulting in pollution damage); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN 
Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (E.D. La. 1981) (negligent operation of ship causing collision 
resulting in pollution damage), afl'd and reh'g en bane granted, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984), 
afl'd on rehearing, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), eert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); 
Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 976-77 (E.D. Va. 1981) (negligent pollution 
of river causing pollution damages). 
20 One court posited that adherence to the physical injury rule was due to the lack of an 
existing alternative rule or principle for guidance. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028. Another court 
noted that the tests that have been developed for prospective economic advantage are pres-
ently inadequate to guide trial courts to consistent, predictable, and fair results. Local Joint 
Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651 P.2d 637 (1982); see infra note 126 and 
accompanying text. 
21 E.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); TAPAA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
22 See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 334 (1973). At 
least one court, however, has read a federal statute broadly enough to include a remedy for 
economic injury. In an order on a pretrial motion, Judge H. Russell Holland of the District 
Court for the District of Alaska ruled that economic loss claims would be permitted in an 
action brought following a 1987 oil spill in Cook Inlet, Alaska. In re the Glacier Bay, Civ. No. 
A88-115 (D. Alaska Sept. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The court ruled that, 
in an action brought under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1651-1655, economic loss claims are compensable and are not limited by established mari-
time law. Id. The court held that in drafting TAPAA, in order to provide adequate compen-
sation to all victims of an oil spill, Congress intended to depart from the limits of maritime 
law. Id. This order opens the suit to the claims of fish processors, traders, tenders, and 
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come the lack of a common law remedy for pure economic loss by 
relying on the federal and state statutes that have provisions for the 
compensation of economic 10sses.23 There are also provisions in fed-
eral statutes that preserve the state law remedies by way of savings 
clauses. 24 
If federal or state statutory remedies are not available, then the 
common law must create standards to recognize claims for pure 
economic losses in marine pollution.25 This Comment proposes a 
uniform threshold standard to consider pure economic losses in ma-
rine pollution cases. This new standard could be used to evaluate 
claims brought in either state or federal maritime jurisdictions. It 
should replace the physical injury rule as a threshold measure prior 
to the application of existing tort law analyses. 
In Section II, this Comment looks briefly at the historical devel-
opment of the physical injury rule26 and the impact that the rule has 
had on marine pollution cases in the past.27 Section II then presents 
a survey of the court-created exceptions to the physical injury rule. 28 
Building on the foundations lain by the existing exceptions to the 
physical injury rule, Section III describes a proposed standard for 
review of pure economic loss claims in marine pollution cases. Fi-
nally, Section III explores the economic, social, and policy consid-
erations dictating the replacement of the physical injury rule. 29 
II. CAUSES OF ACTION TO RECOVER PURE ECONOMIC LOSSES 
A. The Physical Injury Rule 
The physical injury rule springs in large part from the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. 
spotters. [d. at n.5; contra Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., Civ. No. 90-2184 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 
1990) (ruling that TAPAA incorporated existing maritime law, thereby excluding economic 
loss claims unaccompanied by physical injury, court dismissed the motion). 
23 See supra note 22. Also, OCSLA, for example, has a specific Fishermen's Fund to allocate 
damage awards for some pure economic losses. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1842 (1982). Maine law sets 
out specific procedure for arbitration of oil spill damages including pure economic losses. ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551.2 (1964 & Supp. 1989). 
24 E.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(0), 1370 (1982). 
25 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying.text. 
26 See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 45-76 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 81-107 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 248-76 and accompanying text. 
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v. Flint.30 In Robins, the defendant dry dock company negligently 
damaged a ship's propeller in the course of repairs. 31 The plaintiff, 
who had chartered the vessel, sued for loss of profits suffered be-
cause of the extra delay in the dry dock. 32 
The Court held that the defendant had caused damages only to 
the persons owning the ship, not to the charterers.33 The Court also 
found that, because the defendant had no knowledge of the contract 
between the plaintiff and the shipowner, the injury complained of 
was not foreseeable. 34 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, 
explained that the claims did not spring from any legally protected 
interest because the plaintiff charterer had neither a contract with 
the defendant dry dock company nor a proprietary interest in the 
vessel. 35 Holmes' opinion further held that the law did not extend so 
far as to impose liability beyond the claim for property damage that 
was owed to the ship owner. 36 
Subsequent cases holding that a plaintiff cannot recover for eco-
nomic losses unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage 
are numerous. 37 The physical injury rule has been used to deny 
claims arising from activities varying from negligent excavation,38 
and the negligent destruction of abridge, 39 to the negligent prepa-
ration of a balance sheet. 40 The physical injury rule serves as a 
convenient measure by which a court can restrict a defendant's 
30 275 u.s. 303 (1927). A parallel rule developed in England. See Cattle v. Stockton 
Waterworks Co., 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453 (1875) (no recovery where defendant's negligence in 
allowing pipes to leak onto land increased plaintiff's cost under contract with landowner to 
construct tunnel). 
31 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927). 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 309. 
34 See id. at 307-09. 
35 Id. at 307-08. 
36 Id. at 309. 
37 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280,289 
(3d Cir. 1980) (no recovery for pure economic loss in tort actions); Seely v. White Motor Co., 
63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (no recovery for economic 
losses unaccompanied by physical damages); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (no recovery in tort for economic loss without personal injury 
or property damage); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 410-11, 651 P.2d 637, 
638 (1982) (no recovery for economic losses unaccompanied by physical injury or property 
damages). 
38 Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 194,43 S.E. 419, 421 (1903). 
39 Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 94, 41 A.2d 267,269 (1945). 
40 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 183, 174 N.E. 441,446 (1931). 
1990] RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS 91 
liability and exposure to litigation. 41 Fear of fraudulent claims,42 the 
possibility of burdening courts with unnecessary litigation,43 and an 
unwillingness to impose liability out of proportion to a defendant's 
fault44 are among the other considerations underlying the physical 
injury rule. 
B. The Physical Injury Rule in Maritime Cases 
Because Robins was a maritime law case, courts hearing maritime 
claims are apt to find the physical injury rule to be controlling. 45 In 
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank,46 for example, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the 
applicability of the physical injury rule to maritime tort claims.47 
The case arose following a ship collision that resulted in a spill of 
approximately twelve tons of pentachlorophenol in the Mississippi 
River and surrounding waterways.48 The area was temporarily 
closed to navigation and fishing. Several businesses including ship-
ping interests, marinas, boat rentals, restaurants, tackle shops, fish-
41 "The spectre of runaway recovery lies at the heart of the Robins Dry Dock rubric." 
Amoco Transp. Co. v. SIS Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th Cir. 1985); see Byrd, 117 Ga. 
at 193-95, 43 S.E. at 420-21 (1903) (liability limited to avoid collusive claims and excessive 
litigation); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982) 
(physical injury rule is primarily to shield defendant against unlimited liability); see also 
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444-45 (1931) (third-party plaintiff denied 
recovery for reliance on defendant's negligently prepared financial statements). Judge Cardozo 
noted in Ultramares that liability for pure economic losses in negligence would be "liability 
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Id. at 179, 
174 N.E. at 444. 
42 E.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 807, 598 P.2d 60,65, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 
412 (1979) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 940 (4th ed. 1971)). 
43 See Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). 
44 Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Local 
Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982). 
45 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Doxford and Sunderland, Ltd., 782 F.2d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(recovery of pure economic losses resulting from negligent engine repair denied); Louisiana 
ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (recovery of pure 
economic losses incurred after a ship collision denied), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Akron 
Corp. v. MIT Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1983) (recovery for economic losses without 
physical damages following grounding of vessel denied); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. 
United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978) (recovery for interference with business 
expectations as result of negligent construction and maintenance of lock denied), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 908 (1979); cf Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 772 F.2d 1217, 
1221-22 (5th Cir. 1985) (recovery allowed for economic losses accompanied by some property 
damage). 
46 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 
47 Id. at 1021. 
48 Id. at 1020. 
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ers, seafood processors, suppliers, and distributors sued to recover 
for economic losses that resulted from this closure. 49 The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all the 
pure economic loss claims except those of the commercial fishers. 50 
The court of appeals barred the plaintiffs' claims for pure economic 
losses in the Testbank appeal. 51 The majority and dissenters disa-
greed on whether the Robins holding applied to all economic loss 
claims and on whether it would be feasible to substitute an alter-
native rule. 52 The Testbank majority held that the Robins physical 
injury rule should extend to all maritime tort claims because it 
provided a necessary, identifiable, and predictable rule for deter-
mining a defendant's liability. 53 The court held that, although the 
losses and delays from the spill were foreseeable, the pure economic 
losses should be barred by application of the physical injury rule 
because foreseeability alone was insufficient to limit a defendant's 
liability fairly. 54 
The Testbank dissent, on the contrary, advocated for the aban-
donment of the physical injury rule, and preferred instead reliance 
upon the conventional tort principles of negligence, nuisance, fore-
seeability, and proximate cause. 55 The dissent argued that the ap-
plication of the Robins holding should be limited to preventing plain-
tiffs who were neither proximately nor foreseeably injured by the 
defendant from recovering solely by claiming a contractual relation-
ship with an injured party. 56 The dissent further argued that the 
physical injury rule should not be extended to bar the claims of 
plaintiffs who would be able to recover under conventional principles 
of foreseeability and proximate cause. 57 The dissenting opinion ex-
amines some of the rule's exceptions, such as recovery in husband-
wife claims, recovery of fishers for lost earnings, and certain negli-
49 Id. at 1020-21. 
50 Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D. La. 1981). The district 
court noted that seamen are the favorites of admiralty, and that their economic interests 
require the greatest legal protection available. Id. at 1173 (citing Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 
178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953». In keeping with this notion, courts have protected commercial fishers 
when there has been a tortious invasion of their fishing grounds. Id. at 1173. 
51 Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 
52 Compare id. at 1022 with id. at 1039 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 1029. 
54 Id. at 1026. 
55 Id. at 1046 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 1038~9 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 1039 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
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gent interference with contract claims, all of which courts have 
developed to avoid the overly restrictive physical injury rule. 58 
Some courts considering maritime claims for economic losses, 
nevertheless, have distinguished Robins and relied on the traditional 
negligence elements of duty, breach, and causation to evaluate the 
compensability of pure economic loss claims. 59 The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reexamined the physical injury rule and its 
applicability to tort claims in a case arising from a bizarre chain of 
events, Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo. 60 The court consid-
ered pure economic loss claims that the plaintiffs brought after a 
ship broke its moorings, collided with a bridge, and dammed a river. 61 
The district court had found that the damages to the defendants 
were caused by negligent interference with contractual relations and 
concluded that Robins precluded recovery.62 The court of appeals, 
on the other hand, found no reason to differentiate between contract 
rights and other rights that the law protects and therefore viewed 
the actions as claims in tort. 63 The court held that all of the plaintiffs 
had been properly designated as members of the class to whom the 
defendant owed a duty.64 The court held, however, that, even though 
the injuries were foreseeable, the connection between the negligence 
and the injury was too remote and tenuous to allow recovery for 
pure economic 10sses.65 
As it rejected the physical injury rule in Kinsman, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the fear of unlimited collusive 
or fraudulent claims is without basis because courts distinguish hon-
est claims from fraudulent ones almost daily.66 The opinion empha-
sized that the proper role of the courts in considering claims for pure 
58 Id. at 1040-41 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
69 See, e.g., Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers, Inc. v. Lone Star Indus., 638 F.2d 700, 
702 (4th Cir. 1981) (court dismissed plaintiff's economic loss claims, relying on standards set 
forth in Kinsman); In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 441, 448-49 (6th Cir. 1980) (recovery 
of pure economic losses limited to direct injuries that are not found to be merely remote 
consequences of the defendant's action), cen. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Venore Transp. Co. 
v. MN Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978) (recovery granted to charterers of ship for 
lost profits not found to be too remote); Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 
825 (2d Cir. 1968) (recovery denied where pure economic loss claims found too remote from 
the defendant's negligent act). 
60 388 F.2d 821, 823-25 (1968). 
61 Id. at 822. 
62 Id. at 823. 
63 Id. at 824. 
64 Id. at 824 n.6. 
66 Id. at 825. 
66 Id. at 823. 
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economic losses is to rule on a case-by-case basis rather than to 
adhere to a rigid, artificial doctrine. 67 
Ruling on another three-party charter case, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit distinguished Robins in Venore Transporta-
tion Co. v. MN Struma. 68 The court held that a ship charterer could 
recover funds lost while the ship that it chartered was delayed during 
repairs. 69 In Venore, the charterer recovered from a third-party 
defendant those funds that it had paid to the owner of the ship for 
the period of time the ship was disabled due to the defendant's 
negligence. 70 
The Venore court held that the claims in Robins were disallowed 
because of their remoteness from the injury, and because the court 
was concerned about the number of claims that could arise from a 
single event.71 Thus, the court held that although the physical injury 
rule is appropriate in some circumstances requiring a pragmatic 
limitation of liability, it is not required as a limit to all economic 
10sses.72 Restricting its holding to cases involving contractual shifting 
of losses, the Venore court created a narrow exception to the poten-
tially broad sweep of Robins. The Venore exception has received 
approval in other courts. 73 
In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 74 the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia considered the pure economic loss claims 
of several classes of individuals following a widespread pollution 
incident. 75 Although the Pruitt court found neither Robins nor Ve-
nore dispositive, it held that the Venore opinion was sufficient to 
restrict the reach of Robins to cases dealing specifically with claims 
arising from interference with contract. 76 
Even though a plaintiff may base a claim for marine pollution 
damages either in negligence or in nuisance,77 the physical injury 
67 See id. at 823-25. 
68 583 F.2d 708 (1978). 
69 Id. at 711. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 710. 
72 Id. at 710-11. 
73 See, e.g., Amoco Transp. Co. v. SIS Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Standard Navigazione, S.p.A. v. MN K.Z. Michalos, 1981 Am. Mar. Cas. 748, 761 (S.D. Tex. 
1981). 
74 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
76 Id. at 976. 
76 Id. at 981. 
77 Pollution victims often rely on common law remedies because, although United States 
waterways are highly regulated, provisions for private actions for pollution damages in the 
statutes are scarce. The most comprehensive statute, the FWPCA, does preserve those state 
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rule may bar recovery.78 To avoid such a harsh result, some courts 
endeavor to fashion a more flexible rule that limits liability and at 
the same time allows for the adjudication of meritorious claims. 79 In 
order to increase the scope of legally cognizable claims, courts have 
distinguished Robins on the facts and carved out exceptions to the 
physical injury rule for the pure e.conomic loss claims of specific 
plaintiffs, notably sailors and commercial fishers. 80 
C. Exceptions to the Physical Injury Rule 
1. Special Relationships 
The result of courts' dissatisfaction with the physical injury rule, 
in several different contexts, has been the creation of qualifications 
and exceptions to the rule to permit adjudication of pure economic 
loss claims.81 One of the largest groups of exceptions to the physical 
injury rule includes those cases involving a "special relationship" 
between the tortfeasor and the person claiming economic 10ss.82 In 
several instances, courts have held providers of professional services 
liable for pure economic losses that resulted from negligent perfor-
law and common law remedies that do not conflict with the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(0), 1370 
(1982). In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 
22 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the FWPCA preempts federal common law of nuisance. 
Only the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the preemption extends to maritime 
tort law. Conner v. Aerovox, Inc., 730 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1984). Some courts will still 
consider marine pollution tort actions under both state law and maritime law. See, e.g., Pruitt, 
523 F. Supp. at 977, 981. 
78 Even though the decisions from which the physical injury rule arose did not mandate an 
absolute bar to recovery of pure economic losses, the development of subsequent case law has 
led to a general rule barring recovery for such losses. For discussions of the history and 
arguments surrounding the absolute bar to recovery for pure economic losses, see, e.g., Union 
Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 566 (9th Cir. 1974); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985). See also Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. 
Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453 (1875). 
79 See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 254, 495 A.2d 107, 
111 (1985). 
80 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fishers 
granted recovery for economic losses); Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 
(E.D. Va. 1981) (commercial fishers, and other specified businesses as surrogates for sport 
fishers not represented at trial, granted recovery for economic losses); Burgess v. MN 
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D. Me. 1973) (commercial fishers and seafood harvesters 
granted recovery for pure economic losses), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
81 See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 565-66 (opinion tracing history of exceptions to physical injury 
rule in California courts); People Express, 100 N.J. at 256-61, 495 A.2d at 112-14 (rejecting 
physical injury rule, based upon precedents in several states). 
82 See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 566; People Express, 100 N.J. at 256-58, 495 A.2d at 112-
13. 
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mance of their work. 83 Decisions of the California state courts in 
such cases provide substantial guidance for consideration of pure 
economic loss claims. 84 
The foundational case for pure economic loss recovery via the 
special relationship exception is Biakanja v. Irving.85 In Biakanja, 
the California Supreme Court l,1eld that the plaintiff's pure economic 
loss, which was the result of the defendant's negligent failure to 
obtain proper attestation of a will, was a legally cognizable injury. 86 
The Biakanja decision sets out a test that balances several factors 
to determine the duty of due care. 87 The court weighed the following: 
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the 
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, 
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the 
policy of preventing future harm. 88 
Relying heavily on the principles of duty and foreseeability to limit 
liability, the California Supreme Court found that pure economic loss 
claims arising from negligence may be considered similarly to claims 
83 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958) (notary held liable for 
negligence that caused intended beneficiaries of will to be deprived of bequest); see also Lucas 
v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588-89, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823-24 (1961) 
(attorney held liable to intended beneficiary of will where negligence caused deprivation of 
bequest), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); People Express, 100 N.J. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118 
(railway transporting explosive chemicals had duty to avoid causing economic loss to neigh-
boring businesses); see generally LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 130 at 1008-09. 
84 See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) 
(owner's contractor liable for economic losses of tenants); Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 583, 364 P.2d 
at 685; Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 647, 320 P.2d at 16; Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 
218,24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962) (termite inspectors hired by seller liable to purchasers of building); 
M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961) (engineer 
contracting with sanitary district liable to municipality also liable to general contractor in 
construction project) (reported sub nom. M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary 
Dist.). 
86 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). 
86 [d. at 648,651,320 P.2d at 17, 19. 
87 [d. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. 
88 [d.; see also LAW OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 4 (discussing factors influencing tort liability). 
The Biakanja criteria have been applied to subsequent cases in California and adopted by 
other states. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (oil company had 
duty of due care to avoid injury to resources that it shared with fishers); Mattingly v. Sheldon 
Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1987) (college had duty to take reasonable precau-
tions to avoid harm to contractor working on campus); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 
364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 262-64, 495 A.2d 107, 115-16 (1985) (railway had duty to avoid causing 
economic injury to neighboring businesses). 
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accompanied by injury to property or persons. 89 In place of the 
physical injury bar to recovery, some courts determine the extent 
of a defendant's liability for pure economic losses through a careful 
analysis of the concepts of foreseeability90 and duty. 91 
Courts across the country have expanded the exception to the 
physical injury rule for parties in a special relationship to include a 
wide range of actors, from attorneys to termite inspectors.92 In each 
case the deciding court permitted pure economic loss claims because 
it found that the defendant had a duty of due care, that the losses 
were proximately caused by the defendant's actions, and that the 
injury to the particular plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. 93 
Courts also have created a related exception to provide recovery 
for the pure economic losses of plaintiffs who are members of a 
particular group to which the courts extend special protection. This 
exception to the physical injury rule is based upon the foreseeability 
to the defendant of the particular class of plaintiffs, as well as a duty 
of due care.94 Such plaintiffs are not merely members of the general 
public; rather, certain circumstances put them in a unique position 
that defines them as a foreseeable group. The duty of due care has 
been held to include within the group of foreseeable plaintiffs a 
business neighbor abutting a railroad yard. 95 
Most notable among the groups traditionally granted compensa-
tion for pure economic losses in tort actions are sailors. 96 In Carbone 
v. Ursich,97 seamen were allowed to recover from a negligent third 
party for wages lost while the ship on which they worked was being 
B9 J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 806, 598 P.2d 60, 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 
(1979). 
90 Id. 
91 See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570. 
92 Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 588-89,364 P.2d at 687-88,15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24 (duty of attorney 
to beneficiary of will); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 649-50, 320 P.2d 16, 18-19 (1958) 
(duty of notary to secure proper attestation of will); Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 
218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962) (duty of termite inspector to third party); Miller Co. v. Dames 
& Moore, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 308-09, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1961) (duty of engineer to 
successful bidder) (reported sub nom. Miller v. Central Costa Sanitary Dist.); Rozny v. 
Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 67-68, 250 N.E.2d 656, 663 (1969) (duty of surveyor to third parties 
who relied on inaccurate survey); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 
138, 153 (1983) (duty of independent auditor to all those who foreseeably might rely on financial 
statements). 
93 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 257, 495 A.2d 107, 
112 (1985). 
94 Id. at 263-64, 495 A.2d at 116. 
96 Id. at 265, 495 A.2d at 118; see infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. 
96 Carbone v. Ursich (The Del Rio), 209 F.2d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953). 
97 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953). 
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repaired. 98 Commercial fishers, in particular, almost always have 
been able to recover for pure economic losses. 99 
2. Particular Knowledge of the Harm 
When a defendant has knowledge of the potential economic con-
sequences of a particular activity that it undertook, the courts have 
created another exception to the physical injury rule. 1°O In J'Aire 
Corp. v. Gregory,l°l a contractor working for the owner of a building 
was held to owe a duty of due care to the owner.102 The contractor 
also was found to owe a duty to the tenants of the building to 
complete construction on schedule to avoid resulting economic 
losses. 103 Similarly, in Henry Clay v. City of Jersey City,104 the court 
found the defendant city liable to a lessee for pure economic losses 
that resulted from the city's negligent failure to maintain its sewer 
lines. 105 The city had notice of the sewer leak for several years, and 
the court held that it should have known about the leak even sooner 
than it did. 106 Courts have created these exceptions to the physical 
injury rule when the defendants have failed to adhere to a duty of 
due care to prevent a foreseeable injury. 107 
98 Id. at 182; accord Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 818-20 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (crew members of fishing boat permitted recovery for share of lost catch when 
vessel negligently detained because of a faulty engine); Main v. Leask, 1910 Sess. Cas. 772, 
778-79 (Scot. 2d Div.) (fishermen working on crew-share system permitted to recover shares 
of anticipated profits without any physical injury when vessel was damaged by the defendant's 
negligence). 
99 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 560, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (oil company liable 
for economic losses of commercial fishers); Louisiana ex rei. Guste v. MN Testbank, 524 F. 
Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D. La. 1981) (liability imposed for pollution resulting from ship collision 
to compensate commercial fishermen, shrimpers, crabbers, and oystermen), afl'd and reh'g 
en banc granted, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd on rehearing, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 
1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 
975, 978, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981) (chemical company found liable for economic losses of sport and 
commercial fishers); Burgess v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (liability 
imposed in oil spill for economic losses of commercial fishers and seafood harvesters). 
100 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 260-61, 495 A.2d 
107, 114 (1985). 
101 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). 
102 Id. at 805, 598 P.2d at 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 411. 
103 Id. 
104 74 N.J. Super. 490, 181 A.2d 545 (Ch. Div. 1962), aff'd, 84 N.J. Super. 9, 200 A.2d 787 
(App. Div. 1964). 
105 Id. at 493, 501, 181 A.2d at 547, 551. 
106 Id. at 496, 181 A.2d at 548. 
107 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 263-64, 495 A.2d 
107, 116 (1985). 
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D. Other Judicial Efforts to Impose Limits to Liability 
1. Negligence 
99 
The need to define some limit to a defendant's liability and the 
need to limit the amount of litigation stemming from a single negli-
gent act are not unique to claims for pure economic losses. Accord-
ingly, courts have denied compensation for physical injury in cases 
where an injury is held not to be foreseeable. The seminal case 
imposing duty and proximate cause limitations to negligence liability 
is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. 108 In helping a passenger board 
a train, one of the defendant's employees negligently dislodged a 
package the passenger was carrying. l09 The package contained fire-
works, exploded when it fell, and knocked over a scale some distance 
down the platform. 110 The scales injured plaintiff Palsgraf. 111 The 
New York Court of Appeals held that, in general, a defendant is 
liable for all proximate consequences of an act that breaches a duty, 
even if these consequences might seem novel or extraordinary. 112 
Even though Palsgraf did suffer physical injury, the court limited 
the defendant's liability by strictly construing the elements of duty 
and foreseeability. 113 
In a case that established an often-cited standard in the field of 
negligence, United States v. Carroll Towing CO.,114 Judge Learned 
Hand set out a balancing test: when the cost of accidents exceeds 
the cost of preventing them, the courts should impose liability. 115 
Stated differently, a person's duty to prevent injuries is a function 
of three variables: the probability that an accident will occur, the 
gravity of the result if it does occur, and the burden of sufficient 
precautions to prevent the accident. 116 The case arose when a barge 
broke loose from its tug, collided with another vessel and eventually 
sank. 117 The court held that the failure of the owner to have a crew 
member aboard the barge was negligence that reduced the owner's 
recovery. 118 
lOS 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
109 [d. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99. 
llO [d. 
III [d. 
112 [d. at 346-47, 162 N.E. at 101. 
Jl3 See id. 
Jl4 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
ll5 See id. at 173. 
Jl6 [d. 
ll7 [d. at 170-71. 
JlS [d. 
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Subsequent courts have read Carroll Towing to represent the 
principle that a fundamental purpose of tort law is to maximize social 
utility.119 It may be difficult for a court to measure the probability 
that an event might occur, the burden of preventing the resultant 
injury, and the sum of all damages from the act.120 In a widespread 
pollution case the imposition of liability using this formula could 
depend upon whether a court looks at the damage to each plaintiff 
individually or at the cumulative effect of the defendant's actions. 121 
Recently, in People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail 
COrp.,122 the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the same 
strict application of duty and proximate cause principles that formed 
the basis for the Palsgraf decision could serve as limits to a defen-
dant's liability and the amount of litigation arising from pure eco-
nomic loss claims. 123 In People Express, the plaintiff airline was 
forced to evacuate its business premises when the defendant's neg-
ligence caused a chemical leak and a fire in a nearby freight yard. 124 
Despite the lack of any physical injury suffered by the neighboring 
airline company, the court found the defendant railroad liable for 
economic damages. 125 
In granting compensation for pure economic losses, the People 
Express court displayed its dissatisfaction with the rule of non-
recovery for pure economic losses. 126 Following an explanation of the 
myriad exceptions to the physical injury rule, the court applied the 
same principles of duty, breach, causation, and injury that it would 
have used to evaluate a claim accompanied by physical injury or 
property damage. 127 
The People Express court based its decision to allow recovery for 
pure economic loss claims on the foreseeability of both the risk of 
this type of harm and the foreseeability of the injury to this plain-
119 See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
120 For example, courts have struggled with the issue of how many pure economic harms 
should be included in assessing the sum of damages from a pollution incident. See, e.g., id. A 
further difficulty arises when not all injured parties choose to sue at the same time. 
J21 See id. at 978-79; see infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. 
122 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985). 
122 Id. at 253, 495 A.2d at 110. "[W]e proceed from the premise that principles of duty and 
proximate cause are instrumental in limiting the amount of litigation and the extent of liability 
in cases in which rio physical harm occurs just as they are in cases involving physical injury." 
[d. 
124 [d. at 249, 495 A.2d at 108. 
125 [d. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118. 
126 [d. at 261, 495 A.2d at 114. "These exceptions expose the hopeless artificiality of the 
per se rule against recovery for purely economic losses." [d. 
127 See id. at 263-65,495 A.2d at 116-17. 
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tiff.128 It held that the defendant railway possessed knowledge of the 
risk of harm in its activities sufficient to impose a duty of due care 
to avoid causing economic damages to those it knew might be in-
jured. 129 The court noted that general or simple foreseeability of 
some harm from the defendant's act would be insufficient to create 
liability.130 Both the specific risk of harm and the specific plaintiff or 
class of plaintiffs had to be foreseeable. 131 The court determined that 
limiting compensation to "particularly foreseeable" plaintiffs was an 
adequate method to limit liability in place of the artificial physical 
injury rule. 132 
2. Nuisance 
A court will permit a private action for damages under the public 
nuisance rubric only if a plaintiff can show special damages to the 
plaintiff's person or property that are different in kind from those 
suffered by the general public. 133 These special damages may be 
based upon the exercise of a public right in the course of earning a 
living,l34 or they may be based upon financial losses resulting from 
a plaintiff's special proximity to the nuisance. 135 If a claim involves 
interference with a public right, an individual must show how the 
individual's exercise of this right is distinct from that of the general 
public. 136 
128 [d. at 267-68, 495 A.2d at 117-18. The court found the existence of an emergency 
evacuation plan to be evidence of the rail company's knowledge of the potential risk. [d. 
129 Further defining the foreseeability of the harm that it deemed to be recoverable, the 
court included those economic losses that were "the natural and probable consequence[s] of a 
defendant's negligence." [d. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118. 
130 See id. at 268, 495 A.2d at 118. 
131 See id. The court recognized the need to consider each case upon its own facts. [d. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also recognized the need for looking at pure economic 
loss claims on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 
821, 823-25 (2d Cir. 1968). 
132 People Express, 100 N.J. at 262-63, 495 A.2d at 114-15 (quoting W. PROSSER, THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 941 (5th ed. 1984». 
133 See Burgess v. Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (commercial fishers' and 
shellfish harvesters' exercise of public right found to be distinct from general public's; beach-
front business' exercise of rights not found to be distinct), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
134 [d. The Restatement (Second) of Torts uses examples of economic damages to log rafters 
unable to float logs past a dam, boat owners unable to pass under a new bridge, and commercial 
fishers unable to fish after pollution of a waterway. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C, 
comment h, illustrations 9-11 (1979). 
136 See Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 240-41, 117 N.W.2d 322, 
326-27 (1962). Despite a potential for expansive liability, the Karpisek court viewed the 
evidence of the plaintiff's financial loss without regard to the number of people who might be 
in the same category. [d. at 241, 117 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 79). 
136 See Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (E.D. Va. 1981) (rights of 
all fishers found different from other businesses'); Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250-51. 
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If a plaintiff's business losses are based upon the exercise of a 
public right, or a riparian right, courts have found that pure eco-
nomic losses are compensable under the public nuisance theory. 137 
Courts have recognized the interference with the rights of commer-
cial fishers as a special injury in public nuisance actions. 138 When 
plaintiffs depend upon the right to use a resource such as the water, 
the economic losses suffered by the direct users become particularly 
foreseeable because the losses are so closely connected, through the 
use of the resource, to the defendant's acts. 139 
Although courts primarily address ongoing conditions as nuis-
ances, even a single negligent act can rise to the level of public 
nuisance. 140 For example, the negligent operation of a ship resulting 
in its collision with a bridge might create a nuisance in the obstruc-
tion of a public way.141 Similarly, an oil spill or accidental discharge 
of chemicals into a waterway can rise to the level of public nuis-
ance. 142 
If whole communities suffer the same type of harm, the injury is 
a public wrong and individual plaintiffs cannot recover. 143 In Karpi-
sek v. Cather & Sons Construction, Inc.,144 however, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that the number of persons 
137 See, e.g., Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250; Louisiana ex rei. Guste v. MN Testbank, 524 
F. Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D. La. 1981) (fishers' commercial use of public right), afI'd and 
reh'g en bane granted, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984), afI'd on rehearing, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (en banc), eert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Cases involving riparian rights are 
arguably of a different nature than cases involving the exercise of a public right. In the 
riparian rights cases there is no question of ownership, and there also may be some property 
damage involved. These cases represent, nevertheless, a large class of economic loss claims 
that long have been allowed by the courts. See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 
23 So. 2d 756, 757-58 (1945) (en banc) (operator of fishing camp exercising riparian right to 
provide access to river); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 548, 27 S.E.2d 
538, 546-47 (1943) (downstream riparian landowners exercising right to fish). 
138 See, e.g., Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250-51; Columbia River Fishermen's Protective 
Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 659-60, 87 P.2d 195, 197 (1939); Strandholm v. 
Barbey, 145 Or. 427, 438~9, 26 P.2d 46, 51 (1933); Morris v. Graham, 16 Wash. 343, 345,47 
P. 752, 752 (1897). Contra Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee, 83 Wis. 583, 588-89, 53 N.W. 912, 
913-14 (1892). 
139 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Co., 100 N.J. 246, 260, 495 A.2d 107, 114 
(1985). 
140 Stop & Shop Co. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 890, 894, 444 N.E.2d 368, 369, 371 (1983). 
The dissent in Testbank noted, "It is well settled that a public nuisance can arise out of 
conduct that is merely negligent." 752 F.2d at 1046 n.27 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
141 Stop & Shop, 387 Mass. at 890, 894-97, 444 N.E.2d at 369, 371-73. 
143 See, e.g., Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 248,250. 
143 See, e.g., Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 251; Stop & Shop, 387 Mass. at 897, 444 N.E.2d at 
373 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C comment h). 
144 174 Neb. 234, 117 N.W.2d 322 (1962). 
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with special injuries could be so large as to remove a plaintiff's right 
to compensation in a public nuisance action. 145 In an action to enjoin 
the operation of an asphalt plant and recover damages under the 
public nuisance doctrine, the court required that the private plain-
tiff's injury be different in kind from the injury suffered by the 
public at large. 146 The fact that in this case several plaintiffs joined 
in the action, however, did not refute the argument that each plaintiff 
had suffered a special injury.147 The court held that, because "more 
than one, or in fact a considerable number" of individuals suffered, 
"does not mean that each of them have not received injury which 
differed in kind and not merely degree from the community gener-
ally. "148 
In Stop & Shop Companies v. Fisher,149 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff's pure economic loss 
claims were legally cognizable. 15O Access to the plaintiff's store was 
cut off following a ship collision with a bridge that caused a two-
month road closing. 151 The plaintiff sought lost business revenues 
under both negligence and nuisance theories. 152 On appeal, the Su-
preme Judicial Court disallowed the claims for economic loss in 
negligence because there was no physical damage to the store. 153 
The court opined, however, that the defendant's action might give 
rise to a public nuisance if the plaintiff could show special pecuniary 
harm. l54 The court stated that the same claims that were barred in 
negligence because of the physical injury rule were legally cognizable 
under a public nuisance cause of action. 155 
The Massachusetts court found that special damages must be eval-
uated on a case-by-case basis, looking at both the severity of the 
financial harm to a plaintiff and the losses suffered by the rest of the 
community.156 Although the court recognized that a physical injury 
requirement had provided a clear, convenient line between com-
pensable and noncompensable damages, the court stated that clarity 
145 Id. at 241, 117 N. W.2d at 326-27. 
146 Id. at 236,240-41, 117 N.W.2d at 324,326. 
147 Id. at 241, 117 N.W.2d at 326-27 (quoting 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 79). 
148 Id. at 241, 117 N.W.2d at 326. 
149 387 Mass. 889, 444 N.E.2d 368 (1983). 
150 Id. at 899, 444 N.E.2d at 374. 
151 Id. at 890, 444 N.E.2d at 369-70. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 894, 899, 444 N.E.2d at 371, 374. 
154 Id. at 897, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
155 Id. at 894, 897, 444 N.E.2d at 371, 373. 
156 See id. 
104 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:85 
was not sufficient to outweigh the unfairness to businesses suffering 
huge economic 10sses.157 As a limit to the defendant's liability, the 
court held that, absent physical injury, relief in public nuisance would 
be warranted if the plaintiff had suffered "special pecuniary harm" 
and impairment of access. 158 
E. Applications of the Physical Injury Rule in Marine Pollution 
Cases 
In marine pollution cases courts may rely on the exceptions and 
qualifications to the physical injury rule to grant compensation for 
certain pure economic losses. Based upon the duty to, and the par-
ticular foreseeability of, commercial fishers, courts will grant com-
pensation awards for their pure economic losses. 
Burgess v. MIV Tamano159 arose following the grounding of an oil 
tanker off the coast of Maine. 160 Commercial fishers and other busi-
nesses brought suit to recover economic damages that were the 
result of a spill of approximately 100,000 gallons of oil into the coastal 
waters.161 The court found that the claims of commercial fishers and 
seafood harvesters were legally cognizable, but the claims of other 
businesses including motels, trailer parks, restaurants, camp-
grounds, and shops dependent on the tourist trade were not. 162 The 
court, considering the claims under a nuisance theory, found that 
losses to waterfront businesses from the oil spill were merely deriv-
ative of those of the general public and held them to be noncom-
pensable. l63 
A leading case concerning pure economic loss claims in marine 
pollution is Union Oil Co. v. Oppen. l64 Union Oil arose following a 
1969 oil spill in the Santa Barbara channel in California. 165 Huge 
quantities of crude oil were released from an offshore drilling rig, 
causing damage to the marine environment. 166 Commercial fishers 
brought suit against the defendant oil company to recover lost profits 
that resulted from the spill. 167 
157 Id. at 895-96, 444 N.E.2d at 372. 
168 Id. at 899, 444 N.E.2d at 374. 
159 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
160 Id. at 248. 
161 Id. at 248-49. 
162 Id. at 250-51. 
163 Id. at 251. 
164 501 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1974). 
165 Id. at 559. 
166 Id. 
167 See id. 
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In Union Oil, the court found that the defendant owed a duty of 
due care to the plaintiffs to refrain from negligent conduct in its 
operations. 168 The court also stated that the negligent conduct of the 
oil company foreseeably would cause a diminution of aquatic life in 
the area. 169 The court based its imposition of a duty on the fact that 
the commercial fishers were a foreseeable group that might suffer 
injuries. 170 The court distinguished the losses of the commercial fish-
ers from those of other potential plaintiffs based upon the fishers' 
exercise of the public right to fish to make a living.l7l Further, the 
Union Oil court found that the close connection between the oil 
company's activities and those of the fishers, evidenced by their 
shared use of the water, created a sphere within which liability could 
be circumscribed. 172 
Seafood processors, wholesalers, retailers and distributors; res-
taurateurs; commercial fishers; marina, boat, tackle shop, and bait 
shop owners; and employees of all these groups brought suit against 
Allied Chemical in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corporation.173 The 
case arose after it was discovered that the defendant chemical com-
pany had been dumping hazardous chemicals into the James River 
and Chesapeake Bay. 174 Plaintiffs in the seafood industry filed claims 
for their lost profits associated with their inability to sell seafood 
contaminated by the chemicals, and from a drop in price resulting 
from a decline in demand for the seafood. 175 
In Pruitt, the federal district court rejected the Union Oil dictum 
that limited recovery to commercial fishers. 176 The court also rejected 
the idea posited in earlier cases that commercial fishers had a con-
structive property right to the fish. 177 In addition to the claims of 
commercial fishers, the Pruitt court considered the pure economic 
168 [d. at 570. 
169 [d. at 569. Pointing out the fact that even school children are aware of the dangers of 
pollution, the court refused to accept, on the part of the defendants, "a degree of general 
ignorance of the effects of oil pollution not in accord with good sense." [d. 
170 [d. 
171 [d. at 570. 
172 [d. The court noted that it left adjudication of the existence of proximate cause for the 
proceedings on remand. The plaintiffs would have to establish proximate cause by showing 
that the spill did in fact diminish aquatic life, and that the diminution caused the plaintiffs' 
economic losses. See id. 
173 523 F. Supp. 975, 976 n.l (E.D. Va. 1981). 
174 [d. at 976. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 978-79 & n.15. 
177 [d. at 978. 
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losses of businesses inland from the water's edge. 17s Stating that the 
destruction of wildlife should not be a costless activity, the court 
sought a method to compensate those most severely injured by the 
pollution. 179 The court, however, felt compelled to limit liability for 
reasons of equity if the defendant's negligence caused all the 
losses. ISO The court limited compensation to those businesses that it 
found were "directly" using the resource, in an effort to avoid double-
counting. lSI 
F. Maritime Jurisdiction over Marine Pollution Claims 
In addition to applying state common law, courts also have looked 
at pure economic loss claims under the rules of maritime law. 182 
Federal maritime law exists as a distinct body of federal law that 
Congress has preserved specifically to provide a forum dedicated to 
maritime activities. l83 Maritime law now extends beyond maritime 
commerce to include the use and exploitation of the resources of the 
sea. 184 
Federal courts derive jurisdiction over maritime matters from 
article III, section 2 of the Constitution1s5 and through implementing 
legislation. l86 Maritime jurisdiction historically was determined by a 
"maritime locality" test that limited jurisdiction to those injuries 
occurring on navigable waters. 1S7 The Admiralty Extension Act of 
178 See id. at 979. 
179 Id. at 978-79. 
180 Id. at 980. 
181 Id. at 979-80. The court reasoned that, although pollution should not be a costless 
activity, the defendant nonetheless should not have to pay more than once for the same injury. 
To avoid this result, double-counting, the court chose to view the damage claim in terms of 
each plaintiff's investment in material and labor in their businesses, as opposed to the re-
placement value of the resource itself. In Pruitt, the court considered the investments of 
seafood wholesalers, processors, retailers, distributors, and restaurateurs. The court noted 
that the use of each investment as a measure would avoid making a defendant pay for an 
excessive stream of profits extrapolated into the future. Id. at 979. 
182 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561-63 (9th Cir. 1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chern. 
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 
752 F.2d 1019, 1030-31 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Burgess 
v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D. Me. 1973), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
183 See T. SCHOENBAUM & A. YIANNOPOULOS, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 1 (1984). 
184 Id. The words "admiralty" and "maritime" have become interchangeable in common 
usage. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 43 (5th ed. 1979). 
185 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
186 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The statute provides in relevant part: "The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which 
they are otherwise entitled." Id. 
187 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1973). 
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1948 extends maritime jurisdiction to those injuries that arise on the 
water and are consummated on the shore. l88 Courts have construed 
this act to include torts arising from vessel pollution of navigable 
waters within maritime jurisdiction.189 Courts also have included 
pollution damage from a fixed platform drilling operation within 
maritime jurisdiction. 190 
The Supreme Court limited maritime jurisdiction beyond a strict 
locality test in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland. 191 
In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court set out more restrictive criteria 
for evaluating maritime jurisdiction: a two-pronged test requiring 
both a maritime locality and a maritime nexus to establish jurisdic-
tion. 192 If an act damages the water and marine wildlife, then the 
locality test is satisfied. 193 The maritime nexus test requires that the 
tortious conduct or the injury bear a significant relationship to a 
traditional maritime activity. 194 
In the past, maritime law limited this activity to maritime service, 
navigation, or commerce on navigable waters.195 Early cases typi-
cally involved activities such as shipping, fishing, or carrying pas-
sengers for hire on a vessel. 196 Modern case law, however, has held 
that maritime activity extends to pleasure boating and other activ-
ities that may interfere with maritime commerce. 197 Courts have 
188 46 U.S.C. § 740 (Supp. V 1987). The Act provides in relevant part: "[tlhe admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or 
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that 
such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." Id. 
189 Cf. Askew, 411 U.S. at 341; Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 
(D. Md. 1972); California ex rel. Dep't of Fish and Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 
922, 926-27 (C.D. Cal. 1969). 
190 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Oppen v. Aetna Ins. 
Co., 485 F.2d 252,255-57 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
191 409 U.S. 249 (1972). 
192 See id. at 268. 
193 See National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 
1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
194 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). 
195 Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967) (discussing 
the failure of courts to define "traditional maritime activity"); see also Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to torts on all vessels 
on navigable waters). 
196 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 7, at 1.48 (7th ed. 1989) (discussing the varied definitions 
of traditional maritime activity). 
197 Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2895 (1990) (extending maritime jurisdiction to noncom-
mercial vessel at a marina); see also Foremost Insurance, 457 U.S. at 674-75. In an earlier 
case a district court went so far as to say, "A surfboard, by its very nature, operates almost 
exclusively on the high seas and navigable waters, and, just like a small canoe or raft, 
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held that marine pollution is a maritime tort. 198 The maritime nexus 
test can be satisfied whether the maritime activity is the source of 
the injury, such as in a cargo ship collision, or the maritime activity 
suffers the injury, for example, in the destruction of an oyster bed 
by pollution. 199 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the proper treatment 
of marine pollution claims under maritime law in Askew v. American 
Waterways.200 The Court found that, absent state regulation, there 
would be no remedy for private damages in water pollution under 
federal statutory law. 201 The Court recognized that tort claims aris-
ing from marine pollution might be brought under either state or 
maritime common law. 202 The Askew Court further held that Con-
gress did not intend the Admiralty Extension Act to be exclusive. 203 
Instead, the Court contemplated concurrent jurisdiction where state 
law does not interfere with the uniformity and simplicity of maritime 
law. 204 
If pollution claims arise on ocean waters or on inland navigable 
bodies of water that border on several states, or involve parties who 
are beyond any state's jurisdiction, then maritime tort law may seem 
the appropriate choice. But, because the Supreme Court has held 
that the federal water pollution statutes preempt federal common 
law,205 the status of maritime common law is uncertain.206 Where 
there is a gap in the law, or state law fails to provide for fair uniform 
treatment of claims, a general maritime rule can be fashioned to fill 
the gap.207 
potentially can interfere with trade and commerce. For this reason admiralty should develop 
rules of liability relating to a surfboard's operation." Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 
F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965). 
198 See, e.g., Burgess v. MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), a/I'd, 559 F.2d 1200 
(1st Cir. 1977). 
199 National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235, 1235 n.41 (3d 
Cir. -1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
200 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
201 Id. at 332--34. But see In re the Glacier Bay, Civ. No. A88-115 (D. Alaska Sept. 28, 
1990) (private damage claims for economic losses permitted under TAPAA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1651-
1655); see also supra note 22. 
202 Askew, 411 U.S. at 338. 
203 I d. at 341. 
204 Id. at 341-43; see Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981). 
205 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 
(1981). 
206 Conner v. Aerovox, Inc., 730 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1984). 
207 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388, 400-03 (1970) (creating 
maritime common law rule for compensation for death on the high seas). 
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Despite the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the "liberal and 
humane nature of maritime law,"208 judgments for pure economic 
losses in maritime tort have been miserly in comparison with state 
law.209 Whether a maritime tort claim is brought in federal court 
under maritime jurisdiction, in state court under the saving-to-suit-
ors clause,210 or in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the case 
will be governed by maritime law.211 When there is no statutorily or 
judicially established federal maritime rule, the court either will look 
to the applicable law of the states, which to date has been more 
liberal, or will fashion a maritime rule, which, if liberally designed, 
could provide uniform treatment of these economic losses.212 
III. MARINE POLLUTION BEYOND THE PHYSICAL INJURY RULE 
A. Problems with the Current Common Law Treatment of Pure 
Economic Loss Claims 
Adhering to the physical injury rule allows compensation for in-
dividuals suffering economic losses as long as they are accompanied 
by even small property damages. At the same time, the rule denies 
claims for huge losses of a plaintiff who is unable to show property 
damage or physical injury. To prevent this inequity and the preclu-
sion of legitimate claims, courts have carved out exceptions to the 
physical injury rule that grant recovery for pure economic losses.213 
208 American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1980) (quoting Moragne, 398 
U.S. at 387) (granting compensation for pure economic losses in a maritime case). The Alvez 
decision is especially noteworthy because it expanded maritime common law to compensate a 
seaman's wife for loss of society even though the majority of seamen's economic losses are 
provided for in statutes. See, e.g., Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. §§ 541-713 
(1982 & Supp. v 1987); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. V 
1987). 
209 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en 
bane) (compensation for commercial fishers only), eert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Union Oil 
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (compensation for commercial fishers only); 
Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980, 982 (E.D. Va. 1981) (court found most 
economic loss claims would not be compensable under maritime law, relying upon state law 
to provide relief); Burgess v. MIV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (D. Me. 1973) (compen-
sation only to commercial fishers and seafood harvesters), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977). 
210 Like the federal water pollution statutes, the grant of maritime jurisdiction saves all 
state law remedies concurrently with the federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. v 
1987); see also FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1370 (1982). 
211 Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615,617 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959». 
212 See Byrd, 657 F.2d at 621; ef. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388, 
390 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1917). 
213 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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The disparate treatment of claims for pure economic losses reflects 
the need for a more satisfactory standard than the physical injury 
rule for the limitation of tort liability. Although the exceptions and 
qualifications to the physical injury rule are numerous, the require-
ment of physical injury or property damage remains the threshold 
requirement for most legally cognizable claims.214 Concerns about 
unlimited, collusive, fraudulent, or speculative claims illustrate a 
need for some limit to liability. The solution, however, is not nec-
essarily the present bright-line rule requiring physical injury or 
property damage. As one commentator has noted, the physical injury 
rule is simply a pragmatic limitation, but not necessarily the appro-
priate tool for administering justice.215 
The many exceptions to the bar of claims for economic losses 
unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage serve as a 
foundation for the expansion of compensable claims. It is merely a 
logical step from the existing exceptions to the recognition of more 
economic loss claims in marine pollution cases. Read broadly, the 
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen216 and Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Cor-
poration217 decisions could provide compensation to all of those 
businesses that rely primarily upon the use of the marine resources 
damaged by pollution. The potential exists to compensate fish proc-
essors, fish farmers, tourist businesses, vessel operators, the pillars 
of the land, and even some who work for hire. 
The Union Oil court's language, allowing compensation to com-
mercial fishers because they make lawful and direct use of the sea 
as a natural resource, was broad enough to include many other kinds 
of losses beyond those suffered by the commercial fishers. 218 Nothing 
214 Among the cases holding that a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses unaccompanied 
by physical injury or property damage are: Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 1980) (no recovery for pure economic loss in tort 
actions); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18,403 P.2d 145, 151,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,23 
(1965) (no recovery for losses without physical damages); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp 
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (economic loss without personal injury or property 
damage not recoverable in tort); and Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 410-
11, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982) (recovery denied for economic losses without physical injury or 
property damage). 
216 See James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A 
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45, 55-58 (1972). Professor James believes that 
"the prevailing distinction between indirect economic loss and physical damage is probably a 
crude and unreliable one that may need reexamination if a limitation on liability for pragmatic 
reasons is to be retained." [d. at 50-51. 
216 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
217 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
218 See Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570. To support imposing a duty of care, the court granted 
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in the legal, economic, or social policy considerations underlying the 
Union Oil decision required a more restrictive holding. The opera-
tive term seems to have been "direct," which refers to the use of 
the resource. 219 In fact, the decision, stated another way, denied 
claims beyond those of the commercial fishers because the court 
reasoned that they were too remote, or that the other plaintiffs did 
not prove a sufficiently close connection between the act of the 
defendant and their injuries.220 The court asked the same questions 
asked in traditional tort liability cases that do not involve the phys-
ical injury rule. 
Reviewing the Union Oil decision, the Pruitt court found that 
potentially there were many other parties, in addition to the com-
mercial fishers, making direct and lawful use of the sea's resources. 221 
For example, nature photographers, vessel operators, and those who 
process, purchase, and distribute seafood, all make lawful use of the 
sea and its resources. The Pruitt court's effort to define the sphere 
of liability presents a foundation that is much broader than that set 
forth in the earlier pure economic loss decisions. Finding that the 
destruction of marine life should not be a costless activity, the court 
looked for a method to compensate more of the pure economic loss 
claims than maritime law might have allowed. The court did not 
focus on the commercial fishers' exclusive right to the use of the 
resource, but focused instead on the relationship between the par-
ties' claims and the damaged resources. 222 
The Pruitt court was in a difficult position as it attempted to 
expand compensation to a broader group of plaintiffs and at the same 
time to limit the defendant's liability. In its efforts to prevent re-
quiring the defendant to pay repeatedly for the same injury, the 
Pruitt court chose to view the claims as they related to each plain-
tiff's investment.223 This investment-based analysis created the po-
tential to compensate many more of the claims than those for which 
the court actually awarded damages. In order to limit the defendant's 
liability, however, the Pruitt court, like the Union Oil court, denied 
damages to the other seafood businesses besides the fishers because 
relief to those plaintiffs who were found to "lawfully and directly make use of a resource of 
the sea, viz. its fish, in the ordinary course of their business." Id. 
219 See id. 
220 The adjudication of whether the defendant had proximately caused the fishers' pure 
economic losses was left for the proceedings on remand. See id. 
221 See Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 979. 
222 See id. at 979. 
223 Id. 
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it found the injuries suffered by those businesses to be insufficiently 
direct.224 Although the compensation of claims to representatives for 
sport fishers signalled a move in the direction of more complete 
compensation for marine pollution losses, the Pruitt court fell back 
on the "direct" and "indirect" language that is little more than an-
other arbitrary limitation to liability that fails adequately to com-
pensate large numbers of innocent victims. The Pruitt court started 
out against the tide but was forced back by the lack of any other 
standard to propel it into a new wave of review. 
In a concurring opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Test-
bank,225 Judge Williams wrote separately to give greater emphasis 
to, and advocate for, greater expansion of the Union Oil dicta. 226 
Recovery for commercial fishers was granted properly, based not on 
a proprietary interest, but upon the exercise of a right to make a 
livelihood from a resource of the polluted waters.227 Judge Williams 
wrote that the rule of the case should be stated broadly to allow 
recovery for those who are damaged because their livelihoods depend 
upon a marine resource. 228 
If courts were to abandon the physical injury rule, they could then 
control the scope of liability through the application of a uniform 
standard of review for marine pollution claims. A marine pollution 
standard, to be used as a threshold test in tort actions, can be 
synthesized from the policies expressed in the decided cases as de-
signed specifically to address the injuries characteristic of marine 
pollution. A threshold standard of review for pure economic losses 
in marine pollution must be broad enough to cover a wide range of 
harms, yet be restrictive enough to prohibit speCUlative, fraudulent, 
or unlimited claims. Application of such a standard would be prelim-
inary to a traditional tort analysis by the court. 
A specific pollution standard would balance the competing goals 
of compensating a wider range of injured parties and defining limits 
to a defendant's liability. The availability of such a standard would 
provide all parties with an added level of certainty for predicting 
potential recovery and liability in pollution cases. 
224 See id. at 979-80. The claims of the commercial fishers were allowed, as were those of 
the classes that the court designated as surrogates for the sport fishers who were not repre-
sented at trial. The court held that the claims of the other seafood businesses were not 
compensable. [d. at 980. 
225 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 
225 [d. at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring). 
227 [d. 
228 [d. 
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As the supply of natural resources dwindles and the demand for 
these resources continues to increase, the need to protect wildlife 
and unspoiled regions will grow as well. Increasing liability for pol-
lution damage will force industry to internalize the costs of damaging 
resources. Such an expansion of liability for marine pollution dam-
ages also will encourage industry to adopt better safety procedures 
and planning. The marketplace, as a result, will reflect more accu-
rately the true costs of potentially hazardous activities, such as the 
transportation of oil by water, or the use of hazardous chemicals. 
The imposition of liability that truly reflects the degree of a defen-
dant's fault should help prevent future harms by creating incentives 
to cut down risks. 229 
B. Proposed Standard for Recovery of Pure Economic Losses in 
Marine Pollution 
1. The Three Elements of a Marine Pollution Standard 
Rather than judicially creating exceptions to the physical injury 
rule on a case-by-case basis, courts should adopt a uniform marine 
pollution standard of review for the adjudication of pure economic 
loss claims. The marine pollution standard should contain three ele-
ments, to be weighed together, as a precursor to the application of 
the existing elements of tort law. 
The first element is a test for a nexus between the defendant's 
activity, the injury, and maritime activities. The second element is 
a test for whether the plaintiff has a substantial investment in the 
use or exploitation of the marine resources. The third element is a 
test for whether the plaintiff has neglected a substantial opportunity 
to mitigate the plaintiff's own damages. 
A court should consider first the nexus between the losses suffered 
and maritime activity. Rather than relying on the test for a nexus 
between the losses suffered and maritime activity to ascertain juris-
diction, as maritime courts use a similar inquiry, the courts would 
be using this test to define a class of foreseeable plaintiffs. Maritime 
activity should be defined, according to current usage, to include all 
those businesses relying upon the marine resources for employment, 
enjoyment, exploration, or exploitation.230 
229 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266, 495 A.2d 107, 
117 (1985). 
230 A court should consider all those businesses making use of the sea or one of its resources. 
This could include, for example, fish processors, transporters, distributors, marine suppliers, 
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The second part of the test considers the plaintiffs' investment in 
the activity utilizing the marine resource. Plaintiffs who derive a 
substantial portion of their income from, or have a significant in-
vestment of finances or labor in, the use of the polluted resource 
should be considered to have claims worthy of review by the courts. 
This part of the test serves as a method to define the foreseeable 
harms. 
Finally, courts should consider the potential for plaintiffs to miti-
gate their damages. Businesses not wholly dependent upon a re-
source might be able to concentrate on a different aspect of their 
endeavor, or substitute alternative suppliers or products. 
2. Implementation of the Marine Pollution Standard 
This three-part test could be used by state courts and federal 
courts hearing maritime claims to serve as a threshold test to replace 
the physical injury rule. The standards would be used as part of an 
otherwise customary tort case. 
Borrowing from admiralty law, the nexus portion of the test will 
establish the requisite connection between the losses suffered and 
maritime activity. To present a claim that is cognizable in maritime 
law, the injury resulting from marine pollution must be found to be 
within the maritime jurisdiction of our courtS.231 The classification of 
marine pollution as a maritime tort has both jurisdictional and sub-
stantive relevance. If the claims are cognizable in maritime courts, 
plaintiffs are able to bring their action in federal court absent diver-
sity or a federal statutory cause of action. 232 
If maritime law is found controlling, however, recovery may be 
limited to commercial fishers. Because courts applying maritime law 
tend to adhere to the physical injury rule, claims for economic losses 
generally have been denied.233 The Burgess, Union Oil, and Pruitt 
tour operators, and related businesses that would be injured in a widespread pollution incident. 
Although the list at this stage of the test seems extensive, the subsequent application of the 
investment and mitigation factors of the test will ensure that only legitimate claims would be 
cognizable. 
231 See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341 (1973); National 
Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 
453 U.S. 1 (1981); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1974). 
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). 
233 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Doxford and Sunderland, Ltd., 782 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 
1986) (recovery of pure economic losses resulting from negligent engine repair denied); Lou-
isiana ex rei. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (recovery 
of pure economic losses incurred after a ship collision denied), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 
1990] RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS 115 
courts have begun the move away from the physical injury rule. 
Other courts might follow suit, relying in part on the Supreme 
Court's statement that "the liberal and humane nature of maritime 
proceedings suggests the court provide rather than withhold a rem-
edy."234 In the future, courts might create a general maritime rule, 
devise a uniform marine pollution standard for maritime and common 
law, or continue to rely on state common law. 
The investment element of the proposed test is a way to establish 
the requisite close connection between the defendant's act of pollut-
ing the water, and the plaintiff's injury in loss of revenues resulting 
from the decreased availability of the resource. Essentially, a court 
will measure the foreseeability of the possibility of damaging the 
resource, and evaluate the injury that would result. 
The mitigation part of the test should follow from courts' require-
ments of reasonable efforts to mitigate.235 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts dictates that an injured party cannot recover damages for 
negligent harms that could have been avoided by taking some ac-
tion.236 With this limitation in mind, courts should consider a plain-
tiff's effort to substitute products or suppliers, or to change the 
emphasis of a business when possible. A court could reduce or elim-
inate claims entirely when mitigation is successful. 
3. Class Actions 
Because courts may rely on the factors set out in United States v. 
Carroll Towing and, therefore, may not impose liability unless the 
cost of the damage is greater than the cost of preventing that dam-
age , 237 individual plaintiffs' opportunities for recovery in a pollution 
case may be severely restricted.238 A court can overcome this re-
striction of individual recovery by certifying a class action. In a class 
action the liability potentially will be much greater than the cost of 
(1986); Akron Corp. v. Mff Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1983) (recovery for economic 
losses without physical damages following grounding of vessel denied); Dick Meyf'rs Towing 
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978) (recovery for interference 
with business expectations as result of negligent construction and maintenance of lock denied), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). 
234 American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1980) (quoting Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970». 
235 Henry Clay Corp. v. City of Jersey City, 74 N.J. Super. 490, 498, 181 A.2d 545, 550 
(Ch. Div. 1962), a/I'd, 84 N.J. Super. 9, 200 A.2d 787 (App. Div. 1964). 
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977). 
237 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Pruitt v. 
Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
238 See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 536 (3d ed. 1986). 
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preventing the harm. The marine pollution standard can be applied 
as a threshold test for individuals or plaintiffs as a group. Major 
pollution incidents may also require class action suits in order to 
manage fairly and efficiently the volume of potential claims.239 
The success of a class action depends upon the care with which 
the classes are divided.240 A positive economic result, imposing lia-
bility on the actor and compensating the victims, can be achieved in 
a class action only if the injuries suffered and the recovery sought 
by each member of the class correspond precisely. An accurate class 
division at the outset will make for a more expeditious trial in the 
long run. 
In defining classes in a case applying the proposed marine pollution 
standard, a court will consider the commonality of the claims with 
regard to the nexus, investment, and mitigation tests. This review 
will supplement the court's analysis of the common questions of law 
and fact that is mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 241 
Although courts are not free to investigate the merits of plaintiffs' 
claims in determining the division of classes, some investigation is 
required in order to determine the common issues of law and fact. 
Given the extra layer of scrutiny that the proposed standard will 
provide, the likelihood of an accurate class division will be increased 
significantly in marine pollution cases using this threshold test. 
289 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out standards for the certification of class 
actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The requirements include: (1) a class so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable; (2) that there be common questions of law or fact between 
all members; (3) that the claims of the class representatives are typical of the claims and 
defenses of the members; and (4) that the representatives will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class. In addition to satisfying these prerequisites, subsection (b) requires 
the court to consider: (1) whether separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent results 
or severely impact the results of other adjudications of the issue; (2) whether final injunctive 
or declaratory relief is appropriate to the class as a whole; and (3) whether a class action is 
superior to other methods of adjudicating the issue. [d. 
240 An estimated 150 lawsuits were filed within the six months following the March 24, 
1989, Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska's Prince William Sound. The court consolidated the 
cases, ordered the creation of a management committee of the plaintiffs' attorneys, and 
requested a proposal for class designations. The damage claimants were divided tentatively 
into eight classes: fishers, fish processors and distributors, union workers laid off by processors 
after the spill, Alaska natives, area businesses that supplied equipment or services to the 
fishing industry, tour operators, recreational users, and municipalities. The class action pro-
posal has drawn criticism from the direct action attorneys who believe that each plaintiff 
should have an individual opportunity to present damage claims. Environmental groups also 
are criticizing the plan because they feel that those who will suffer from the injury to the 
bequest value of the area are inadequately represented. The adequacy of these class certifi-
cations will be reflected in the litigation. See Feder, supra note 6, at 1, col. 4; Sturgis, supra 
note 6, at 104. 
241 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see supra note 239. For an example of a class division in an interstate 
marine pollution case, see Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
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c. Foundations oftke Elements of the Marine Pollution Standard 
The proposed rule for the recovery of pure economic loss claims 
in marine pollution is designed to protect the interests of all those 
who rely upon the marine resource. It is meant to protect the inter-
ests of the innocent victims and at the same time circumscribe the 
universe of potential claims closely enough to assist businesses in 
general planning and predicting liability. 
The requirement that a plaintiff's injury have a maritime nexus 
would preclude some of the remote claims. An airline seeking com-
pensation for lost profits resulting from a decline in tourist traffic to 
the affected area, for example, would not have the necessary con-
nection to maritime activity to establish a compensable claim. If the 
same airline sought lost revenues from transporting fish for proces-
sors, assuming it satisfied the other criteria, it might recover losses. 
Similarly, a hotel suffering losses due to a decline in reservations 
would have a cognizable claim if they could show the nexus between 
their losses and a maritime activity. Such a showing could be made, 
with equal force, by a resort built around fishing boat rentals or one 
that could show a sharp decline in bookings because a pollution 
incident prevented their clientele from participating in some other 
water-related activities. 
Utilizing the current interpretations of maritime activity and le-
gally protected interests, courts could protect the interests of marina 
operators, tour companies, hotels, fishing suppliers, sport fishing 
guides, fish processors, and any others who rely upon the marine 
environment to make a living. A defendant's greater burden of lia-
bility in an area heavily dependent on the waters is in keeping with 
the existence of a greater risk of harm in conducting business there. 
The investment test will reflect the pre-injury market balance of 
resource use. Thus, the investment test serves as a standard for 
courts to measure the extent to which a plaintiff's rights have been 
interfered with. Recognizing that everyone has a right to use the 
resources, but only insofar as there is no unreasonable interference 
with the rights of another, courts will be able to use this balance to 
weigh the claims.242 For example, if a fishing community consists of 
a fish processing plant, a restaurant serving exclusively seafood from 
the bay, and several independent fish boat operators, each will have 
concurrent rights to use the resources. If the restaurant negligently 
dumps chemicals into the water killing the fish, then it would be 
242 Courts. consider injuries to "reasonable investment-backed expectations" in takings 
cases. E.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381,383 (1988). 
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liable to both the fishing interests and the processing plant. The 
interference could be roughly measured in relation to the pre-injury 
investment each enterprise had in that market. Similarly, if a third 
party negligently pollutes the waters, it would be liable to the fish-
ers, restaurant owners, and the processing plant in a measure 
roughly equivalent to each enterprise's pre-injury investment. 243 
American courts generally adhere to the "universally accepted 
principle that a plaintiff must mitigate damages. "244 Although courts 
have looked at mitigation only in apportioning damages,245 the ma-
rine pollution standard mandates a preliminary look at mitigation 
efforts as a method to eliminate frivolous claims.246 Under the marine 
pollution standard, mitigation would not be required for a cause of 
action to lie, but conversely, a plaintiff's refusal to make any attempt 
to mitigate could bar a claim. The traditional elements of mitigation 
for damage claims, which include a showing both that the efforts 
were reasonable and that no action was taken to aggravate the 
economic harm,247 would be applied as a threshold test in marine 
pollution cases. 
D. Economic and Social Policy Support/or the Marine Pollution 
Standard 
1. Social Policy 
Fairness, public policy, and social considerations may all contrib-
ute to a court's decision to recognize pure economic loss claims. Those 
concerns are tempered by a court's objective not to impose liability 
out of proportion with the defendant's fault. A court using the phys-
ical injury rule to limit liability, however, may preclude redress of a 
243 The Pruitt decision describes this type of investment test to avoid the possibility of 
double-counting of damages. Even though the injuries of the wholesalers, retailers, processors, 
distributors, and restaurateurs were all foreseeable and investment-backed, the court was 
unable to formulate a restriction on liability that could at the same time permit compensation 
of these legitimate claims. Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 
1981); see supra note 181. 
244 Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1985). 
245 Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel Co. v. MN Delta, 598 F.2d 930, 932 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(barge owner's efforts to raise vessel held to be reasonable attempts to mitigate damages). 
246 Like mitigation, the rule of "avoidable consequences" applies to a court's consideration 
of the diminution of damages. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 
783 F.2d 347, 350 (2d Cir. 1986). 
247 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Sand & Gravel, 598 F.2d at 932; Federal Ins. Co., 783 F.2d 
at 350. 
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plaintiff's valid claim. 248 Courts that have abandoned the physical 
injury rule have done so because the fundamental fairness of allowing 
a plaintiff the opportunity to present a legitimate claim for damages 
requires closer scrutiny than the rule permits. 249 
Among the six factors set forth by the Biakanja v. Irving court 
for evaluating a defendant's duty of due care was the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct.250 Moral blame and public sen-
timent against harm to the environment heavily favor greater re-
covery for losses in all pollution actions.251 In Union Oil, duty was 
imposed, in part because of the public's deep disapproval of polluting 
activities. 252 The damage award also was intended to prevent future 
negligent conduct especially when, as in offshore oil drilling, the risk 
of harm is common knowledge. 
In People Express, the defendant's knowledge of the volatility of 
the chemicals transported, and the existence of their emergency 
plans, demanded a higher standard of due care than otherwise would 
have been required. 253 Recognizing the risks involved with hazardous 
wastes, Congress has expanded liability to include everyone partic-
ipating in its transportation, handling, manufacture, or disposal. 254 
The justification for courts to grant compensation for economic losses 
in pollution cases is expanding with that duty. 
From the corrective justice standpoint, common law decisions are 
a means of achieving an equitable settlement between individuals. 255 
In many instances a corrective justice view may be in conflict with 
an economic view. When the physical injury rule might restrict 
recovery, corrective justice tips the balance back toward compen-
sation for innocent victims. From an economic perspective, tort law 
is a method of maximizing social wealth and deterring inefficient 
conduct that may run counter to the corrective justice goal of making 
the plaintiff whole again. 
The Pruitt opinion, for example, emphasizes the corrective justice 
balance of punishing the defendant and compensating the injured. 256 
248 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 253, 495 A.2d 107, 
110 (1985). 
24. See id. 
250 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); see supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
251 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558,569 (9th Cir. 1974). 
252 Id. 
253 People Express, 100 N.J. at 246, 267-68, 495 A.2d at 118. 
264 See F. ANDERSON, D. MENDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
LAW AND POLICY 575 (1984). 
255 R. POSNER, supra note 238, at 243. 
256 See Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
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In that case the court did not create an economic inefficiency because 
the liability imposed was not out of proportion with the fault of the 
defendant. If a court takes corrective justice too far, however, the 
result could be double-counting, or compensation of fraudulent 
claims, which would create an economic inefficiency. 
2. Economic Policy 
The enormous financial impact of a widespread pollution incident 
demands that courts must use careful scrutiny before contemplating 
full compensation for all injuries. Nevertheless, even though com-
pensation for commercial fishers alone is more fair than allowing no 
recovery for economic losses at all, in many cases the recovery should 
be much broader than that to reach a correct economic result. Fur-
ther, limiting recovery to commercial fishers often fails to compen-
sate all injured parties. 257 
Under a theory of cost internalization, potential liability for marine 
pollution should be built into the market structure that supports a 
potentially polluting enterprise.258 Rather than treating losses as 
externalities to be borne by the public or by victims, the free market 
system should require industry to include such losses as part of the 
cost of doing business. Such a marketplace model for analysis can 
only be accurate if a court includes all costs. Thus, if there are 
pollution incidents resulting in uncompensated losses, not all of the 
costs will be included in the market pricing structure. 259 From an 
environmental protection standpoint, all costs of manufacturing, pro-
duction, and distribution should be internalized. 
Imposing liability for losses to commercial fishers and other parties 
whose livelihoods rely upon the use of the damaged resource yields 
a correct result in terms of economic efficiency. A decision that leaves 
the burden of the loss on groups such as fishers is unlikely to dis-
tribute losses as efficiently as one that transfers that burden to 
parties such as oil companies or those dumping hazardous wastes. 
Such industrial and business entities can take cost-efficient measures 
257 See id. at 980. The court held that "plaintiffs who purchased and marketed seafood from 
commercial fishermen suffered damages that are not legally cognizable .... This does not 
mean that the Court finds that defendant's alleged acts were not the cause of the plaintiffs' 
losses, or that the plaintiffs' losses were in any sense unforeseeable." Id. 
258 G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 20 (1970). 
259 Cf F. ANDERSON, D. MENDELKER & A. TARLOCK, supra note 254, at 26-27 (citing F. 
ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVE-
MENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 3-4, 22-26 (1977». 
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to prevent or limit diminution of marine life. 260 Imposing liability 
will create greater incentives to take measures to prevent pollution 
accidents. 261 
The Union Oil court's restriction of compensation to commercial 
fishers may stem, in part, from the belief that excessive liability will 
force a business to collapse. The limited compensation in Union Oil 
also reflects a lack of understanding of the need for genuine protec-
tion of resources. The increasing need for the protection of the 
environment, which parallels the increasing demand for natural re-
sources, outweighs the need to limit a defendant's liability in marine 
pollution incidents.262 Given the current societal concerns, the arbi-
trary physical injury rule is of limited use to modern courts. 
In The Cost of Accidents, 263 Guido Calabresi suggests that liability 
for tort losses should be apportioned in a way that will achieve an 
optimal allocation of resources. 264 Under a resource allocation theory 
it is necessary to identify the party that can avoid the costs at the 
least expense-the cheapest cost-avoider.265 Also, if one party is in 
a superior financial position such that it is better able to correct an 
error in allocation, the loss should be shifted to that party as the 
best cost-avoider.266 
Calabresi's economic theories of resource allocation and risk-
spreading267 were among the bases for imposing liability in Union 
Oil. 268 Even though the end result appears scarcely more than a 
decision to impose liability on the party in the best financial position 
to bear the loss, the court also found support for its position in these 
economic theories. 269 The court found that the oil company had the 
capacity to "buyout" the plaintiffs if the burden of liability was too 
great to pay the losses. 27o The notion of oil companies buying out 
commercial fishers, seafood processors, vessel owners, and fish 
tenders, as the Union Oil court suggests, may in some cases carry 
260 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974). 
261 Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 238, at 187. 
262 See People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 30, 37--38 n.5, 544 P.2d 1322, 
1326 n.5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 n.5 (1976) (discussing increase in world fish catch and 
importance of seafood resources). 
263 G. CALABRESI, supra note 258, at 69-73. 
264 See id.; see also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 5 (1960). 
265 G. CALABRESI, supra note 258, at 140-44. 
266 G. CALABRESI, supra note 258, at 150-52; see also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 
558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974). 
267 G. CALABRESI, supra note 258, at 69-73. 
268 See 501 F.2d at 569-70. 
269 Id. 
270 I d. at 570. 
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the economic theory to an extreme.271 In other cases, this may be 
both economically efficient and logical. Regardless, the premise sup-
ports finding greater liability for economic losses in marine pollution 
actions. 
The Pruitt court dismissed out of hand the Union Oil distinction 
between direct exploiters of marine resources and other users.272 
The court's attempt to find a substitute for that standard, however, 
created another distinction between slightly less direct and much 
less direct users of the resources. 273 The court sought some method 
to limit liability and avoid making the defendant pay twice for a 
single negligent act.274 Instead of considering the losses to the fish-
ers, restaurateurs, retailers, processors, distributors, and whole-
salers based upon the value of the resource itself, the Pruitt court 
viewed the lost profits in terms of the loss of the return on the 
investment of each of the plaintiffs in material and labor in their 
businesses. 275 Thus, the independent loss to each business did not 
amount to double-counting of damages. 276 
A predictable system of compensation is critical to the financial 
stability of many coastal communities. In a remote area, or one 
dedicated almost exclusively to the use of the waters, damages and 
subsequent claims for losses due to marine pollution will be partic-
ularly great because of the highly integrated economy and the in-
ability of the plaintiffs to mitigate their losses. If fishing or reliance 
on marine resources were merely an incidental part of an economy, 
however, the ripple effect through its economy would not be as great 
as it would be in an integrated economy. 
A highly integrated economy will be damaged less severely if an 
expeditious and guaranteed system of compensation is established. 
Businesses and individuals could maintain levels of expenditures if 
they could borrow against predicted recovery. If expenditures were 
not cut drastically after a pollution incident, fewer downstream 
losses would be incurred by suppliers and other businesses. The 
system as it exists denies many claims and, at the same time, sub-
jects many other claims to long delays before compensation. The 
combination of denied claims and delays substantially increases the 
total losses from a pollution incident. When courts put the marine 
271 [d. 
272 Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
273 [d. at 979. 
274 [d. at 979-80. 
275 [d. at 979. 
276 [d. 
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pollution standard to use, communities will be able to predict more 
accurately recovery for economic losses, and can continue to do 
business, even in a limited manner, thereby maintaining economic 
stability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
U sing the physical injury rule as a threshold requirement for pure 
economic loss claims in marine pollution results in a system of com-
pensation that is intrinsically inequitable. Although the physical in-
jury rule is grounded on the important notion of limiting and making 
predictable a defendant's liability, its application in marine pollution 
is inappropriate. 
Absence of a marine pollution standard denies many plaintiffs with 
legitimate claims an opportunity to be heard in court. A plaintiff 
with a minor property damage claim accompanied by huge economic 
losses may be fully compensated for all losses. Another plaintiff 
affected by the same pollution, suffering similar economic losses but 
with no property damage or physical injury, may have no legal 
remedy. In a marine pollution case, the majority of the claims for 
economic losses will meet several of the guidelines that courts have 
used to create exceptions to the physical injury rule. The courts 
should join the guidelines from the existing exceptions into a marine 
pollution standard. 
Shared uses of waterways elevates the standard of care with which 
all businesses must perform operations that have the potential to 
cause damage to the resources. The shared use also increases the 
foreseeability of the potential harms, and accurately defines the 
group of particularly foreseeable plaintiffs. The increasing need to 
protect our resources requires closer scrutiny of economic loss claims 
in marine pollution cases than the threshold physical injury rule 
permits. 
Courts should adopt the proposed three-part standard to review 
pure economic loss claims in pollution cases. This standard synthes-
izes the elements existing in the common law exceptions to the 
physical injury rule. Using maritime nexus, investment, and feasi-
bility of mitigation as criteria for compensation will result in a system 
for courts to apply consistently in order to achieve the tort law goals 
of fair compensation and social utility. 
